Legea nr. 207/2025 (Law no. 207/2025) (the “Nordis Law”) between declared intent and normative effect: advances, pre-apartmentation and grey areas
Summary: Legea nr. 207/2025, known in public discourse as the “Nordis Law”, was presented as a legislative response to visible dysfunctions in the property market, with a declared focus on protecting purchasers in transactions involving future assets. The legislature's intervention targets, on the one hand, the regime governing sums paid upon signing preliminary agreements, and on the other hand, the reduction of the risk of the same residential unit being sold multiple times, through an extended cadastral framework. This article briefly reviews the main differences between the version initiated by the Senate and the final published version, focusing on the institution of pre-apartmentation, the mechanisms concerning advances/expenses, and the main practical uncertainties requiring further clarification.
Keywords: Legea nr. 207/2025, Nordis Law, future asset, promise of sale, advance, separate account, pre-apartmentation, land register, ANCPI, purchaser protection
A. Context and stakes
The subject of the legislative amendments brought about by Legea nr. 207/2025 attracted “a quite particular interest”, not so much due to its novelty, but rather due to the scale of the commotion accompanying its adoption. In declaratory terms, the central rationale for the intervention was the protection of purchasers by setting a maximum threshold for sums paid upon signing preliminary agreements, with the aim of reducing financial exposure to the risks inherent in the construction process and of ensuring fairer contractual conditions.
At the same time, in public perception, there was an expectation that the law would also address the issue of “repeated sale of the same residential unit”, a dimension that was not explicitly addressed in the initial form, but which came to be addressed in the final version, through property publicity instruments.
B. From a targeted amendment to a systemic intervention
The initial form (Senate) exclusively targeted the amendment of art. 22 of Legea nr. 10/1995, focusing on developers' obligations and the regime governing promises of sale for future assets, without corresponding provisions in Legea nr. 7/1996.
The published form significantly extends the scope of the regulation: in addition to art. 22 of Legea nr. 10/1995, the legislature also intervenes on art. 26 of Legea nr. 7/1996, introducing paragraphs (9)–(11) and the institution of pre-apartmentation, described as an entirely new cadastral procedure in Romanian legislation. In essence, these new paragraphs set out: (i) the authentic pre-apartmentation deed, (ii) the related cadastral documentation, and (iii) the regime governing amendments made without the consent of the promissory purchaser, subject to certain exceptions.
C. The promise of sale and the “future asset”: stricter conditions
In the initial architecture, the promise could be concluded after: (a) the recording of the building permit in the land register and (b) the drawing up and registration of the apartmentation plan. The regime governing future assets remained relatively summary, without detailed intermediate cadastral stages.
In the published form, the legislature establishes stricter cumulative conditions, shifting the centre of gravity towards property publicity: recording of the permit, completion of pre-apartmentation, opening of individual land registers for the future units, and obtaining land register extracts for each individual future unit. The implicit aim is to reduce the risk of multiple sales, by individualising units from stages prior to the completion of construction.
D. Sums paid by the purchaser: from “maximum advance” to “functional ceilings”
A sensitive point is the shift from an explicit advance ceiling to a formula that may be interpreted as a cap on expenditure made from the sums received.
Initially (Senate): a maximum advance of 10%, with the possibility of increasing it to up to 40% conditional upon the existence of financial loss insurance; the sums were to be used exclusively for the development of the project.
Published form: the insurance mechanism is abandoned; “functional” ceilings are introduced (25% for the structural framework and 20% for installations), advances must be deposited into a separate account, and unlawful use is punishable as a regulatory offence with a fine of 1% of turnover.
Nonetheless, we note that a discussion persists as to the actual object of these ceilings: do they concern the amount of the advance that may be collected, or merely the expenses permitted from the sums received? The view already taking shape among practitioners is that the advance ceiling has been eliminated. In their view, in the absence of an express clarification, the distinction will inevitably be settled in practice and, possibly, in litigation. Nevertheless, we hope that these aspects will be clarified through an appropriate set of methodological rules.
E. Elements “lost” during the legislative process
By comparison, a few mechanisms that appeared in the version adopted by the Senate have disappeared from the final published version:
1. The role of the lawyer and the reduction of the notarial fee: a 25% reduction in the notarial fee was envisaged if the purchaser was assisted by a lawyer at the promise stage and, as applicable, at the final contract stage. This mechanism has been eliminated.
2. The regime of preferential creditors in the developer's insolvency: the state and the promissory purchaser/purchaser would have acquired the status of preferential creditors; this provision no longer appears in the final form, with an impact on the order of priority in the distribution of the insolvency estate. Nevertheless, we note that the promissory purchaser remains, as before, protected under art. 2386 of the Civil Code, benefiting from a legal mortgage over the property subject to the promise, to secure the return of the advance.
On the other hand, the form adopted by the Senate regulated a purchase reservation agreement subject to a strictly limiting regime (maximum duration of 60 days, advance payment of no more than 5% of the price, sanctioned by absolute nullity), establishing an obligation to refund the sums paid in the event that the promise or the final contract was not concluded. By contrast, the published form introduces the additional condition that the failure to conclude the promise be attributable to theexclusive fault of the developer, the effectiveness of this requirement being conditional on the extent to which, in practice, situations of "exclusive fault”.
F. Practical questions and risks of non-uniform application
From an application standpoint, we consider that a number of ambiguities remain, which we set out below in the form of questions that will realistically arise both in notarial practice and in contractual negotiations. Without intending to formulate answers, we invite practitioners to reflect on and address these issues, confining ourselves, at this stage, to stating them, in the hope that they will be clarified through methodological norms and/or an order of the ANCPI.
1. Under the transitional regime, if the notary requires a land register extract from the land's land register, is there a risk of transactions being blocked and of the simultaneous sale of several apartments becoming impossible? The suggested answer is that the extract should be individualised for the future unit, issued from the land register of the land, based on the distinct entry under which the building permit for that unit is recorded, which would in principle allow for parallel promises, although the effectiveness depends on the "granularitatea" accepted by the system and ANCPI's practice.
2. Do the caps established by the law effectively concern the amount of the advance payment that may be collected, or do they refer exclusively to the limits on expenditure that may be made from the sums collected, without thereby establishing an express cap on the advance payment relating to promises?
3. What sanction applies where, under promises, sums are collected that exceed the legal thresholds (to the extent these are interpreted as limits on the advance payment), in the absence of an express prohibition on collecting such sums?
4. How is the transition from the transitional regime to pre-apartmentation carried out for promises already recorded in the land's land register: are additional documents or mandatory updates required?
5. Does a regulatory gap remain with respect to the remaining sums collected by the developer, representing the difference up to 100% of the price (approximately 55%): are these sums still subject to any "approval for payment" clearance or additional formal requirements, or do they become freely usable by the developer once the load-bearing structure and installations are completed?
6. How is the fine established for the developer's use of sums collected from the promissory buyer for purposes other than those provided by law (essentially concerning the 45% percentage) effectively applied, given that the sanction is calculated by reference to the previous year's turnover, while in practice numerous projects are carried out through SPV-type companies with no relevant turnover, in their first year of operation or with zero turnover, including where the initial financing is obtained through a loan for the purchase of the land, an operation that does not enter into the calculation of turnover, with the result that the sanction is deprived of any practical effect?
7. Is the prior consent of the promissory buyer required, provided for exceptionally in cases involving changes to the total surface area or location of the unit that is the subject of the promise, as a result of a change in the number of individual units included in the initial building permit and the updating of all land registers, also in the case of changes affecting elements of the condominium designated as common areas? In the same vein, is this consent also required in the case of a change to the parking space or location allocated to the unit?
G. Conclusions
The legislative journey of the Legea nr. 207/2025 (Law no. 207/2025) reflects a genuine effort by the legislature to address evident dysfunctions in the real estate market, while at the same time revealing ambiguities, gaps and incomplete regulatory solutions that call for further clarification. By formulating the questions above, we consider that a necessary invitation is taking shape, addressed to the legislature and the competent authorities, to intervene and provide practitioners with clear benchmarks for application, all the more so as it is reasonable to assume that these are not the only situations that will generate difficulties in practice.
Although the legislative bill has visibly departed from its originally stated purpose, namely the establishment of an express cap on the advance payment, an objective that underpinned the explanatory memorandum and which was ultimately abandoned in the final form of the law, we nevertheless consider that the legislative intervention is not devoid of positive effects. Even in this configuration, Law no. 207/2025 introduces mechanisms that may lead to enhanced financial protection for persons purchasing property from a developer, in particular through strengthening the land publicity regime and by limiting, albeit indirectly, the use of sums paid by buyers.
It remains essential, however, that these mechanisms be supplemented and made operational through methodological norms and, at least as regards pre-apartmentation, through an ANCPI order detailing the steps, conditions and effects of this newly introduced institution, so that the objective of protecting buyers is not diverted or emptied of substance through non-uniform practices.
Alexandru Alexandrescu, Associate Buju Stanciu & Asociații